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ASSISTANCE IN DYING: ACCOUNTING
FOR DIFFERENCE
CATHERINE J. JONES·

We tend to live-or think we live-in a generically driven soci
ety. Sizes are unisex; directions on medicine bottles are written for
adults or children (that's as specific as it gets); medical research
often is conducted on patient populations that exclude many of the
persons most affected by the conditions being studied, often in the
name of "protecting" them. Our generic standards are no more ge
neric, though, than Chief Justice Tmdal's Nineteenth Century asser
tion that those charged with negligent behavior would be judged by
a standard of the "man of ordinary prudence."1 Although Chief
Justice Tmdal's standard was subsequently interpreted to be gender
neutral and generic, my guess is that when he said "man of ordinary
prudence" he meant just that.
I believe in making legal the giving of assistance to those who
would choose to end their lives by other than natural causes.2 I am
not sure my position on legalization of assisted dying is correct.
What I am sure of, however, is that if we frame the question in
terms of the so-called generic patient-if we do not consider issues

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of LaW; B.A., Gettys
burg College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M., Yale Law School. This
article was originally presented at the Physician-Assisted Suicide Symposium at West
ern New England College School of Law on October 18, 1996. I have made minor
revisions to the text since that time.
My thanks to David Moss, who may give new meaning to the expression "Fools
rush in where angels fear to tread." Last spring, when David called to tell me about his
plans for the Conference, I was overwhelmed that a new teacher, teaching four new
courses in his first year at an institution, would take on such a major task. I knew,
however, that David is very competent and I could hear the enthusiasm in his voice, so I
encouraged him. The Conference was the result of that competence and enthusiasm.
My thanks also to Joan Mahoney who, as Dean of the law school, told David to "Go for
it" when he presented her with his ideas. Her support was crucial to the Conference.
Finally, I am very grateful to Michele Dill LaRose and Pat Newcombe of the law
school's library staff without whose assistance this paper would not have been com
pleted, or even started. Michele's and Pat's work exemplifies what is both routine and
best about the Jaw school's superb library staff.
1. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
2. I prefer the term "assisted dying" rather than "physician-assisted suicide" be
cause of the negative connotations associated with the word "suicide."
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relating specifically to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
age, and different degrees of physical or mental ability-we cannot
possibly reach the appropriate answer.
Before examining the ambiguities, what certainties do we
know about self-inflicted death and assisted death? We know that
in 1990, 12.25 out of every 100,000 people in the United States died
by intentional self-inflicted means. 3 We also know that those num
bers may be low because frequently deaths that occur by overdose
are classified as having resulted from natural causes.4 We know
that in 1991, intentional, self-inflicted death was the eighth leading
cause of death in the United States and that most of those dying by
this method were white men.S We know that women attempt sui
cide at six times the rate of men, but that men die more often. 6
The reason why men die more often is that they tend to use
more violent means. 7 We know that men succeed at self-inflicted
death more often than women because guns are 95 % lethal in sui
cide attempts. 8 Women often attempt to die by overdose, a fre
quently ineffective method of killing oneself. 9 What we do not
necessarily know, however, is why women choose to attempt to
take their lives by pill rather than by another method. Many hy
potheses exist: women really do not want to die; rather, the attempt
by pill is to draw attention and to ask for help. Women are less
violent than men and therefore less prone to use more violent
means of taking their lives. Women, always the caretakers, worry
3. See Julie Marquis, 32% Dip in State Sui~ides Found as U.S. Rate Rises, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at B1.
4. See Jim O'Connell, Suicide Rate is Worrisome, PATRIOT LEDGER, Feb. 15,
1996, at 17.
5. See Marquis, supra note 3.
6. See Gun-Suicide High Among Harris County Women, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Mar. 20, 1995, at B2.
7. For example, three quarters of all elderly men who commit suicide do so by
gun. See Don Colburn, U.S. Suicide Rate Rises 9% for Elderly Since '80, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1. Men also tend to commit suicide by hanging or by
jumping from tall buildings. See Stephanie Gutmann, Death and the Maiden: Dr.
Kevorkian's Woman Problem, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1996, at 20, available in
WESTLAW, HWD database. As most readers know, Nancy Cruzan was a young pa
tient in a persistent vegetative state whose right to have feeding tubes withdrawn was
ultimately argued before the United States Supreme Court. See Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). How ironic that the father who loved
her, and carried forward the fight to have her treatment withdrawn, took his own life by
hanging. See Eric Pace, Lester Cruzan is Dead at 62; Fought to Let His Daughter Die,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at B12.
8. See Gun-Suicide High Among Harris County Women, supra note 6.
9. See Gutmann, supra note 7.
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much more about the stress on those who will find them dead and
would prefer to present a peaceful image rather than a body dis
torted by violence. 1o
We also know that the self inflicted death rate among the eld
erly is rising rapidly. Those over the age of sixty-five account for
13% of our population, and for 20% of the country's suicides. l l
The suicide rate for elderly white men is 38.4 per 100,000,12 more
than three times the national rate for the population as a whole. 13
The elderly actually attempt suicide less often than the population
in general, but they have a higher rate of causing their death. This
may be because they are more deliberate than younger people and
almost certainly because three-fourths of the elderly men and one
third of the elderly women attempting suicide do so by gun. 14
In terms of assisted dying, what do we know? We know that
almost three-fourths of the country's population agree that some
people in some situations should be able to seek the assistance of
another in dying without legal liability attaching to the one assist
ing. 1S Those situations relate more to physical pain than to non
physical circumstances such as a fear of being a burden to one's
family or feeling thatlife is not worth living. 16 The country's physi
cians are fairly well divided on the question of assisted dying, with
support or opposition frequently varying by specialtyP Studies
10. See Leslie Bender, A FeministAnalysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Vol
untary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REv. 519, 521 n.4 (1992); Nancy J. Osgood &
Susan A. Eisenhandler, Gender and Assisted and Acquiescent Suicide: A Suicidologist's
Perspective, 9 ISSUES L. & MEo. 361 (1994).
11. See Colburn, supra note 7.
12. See Larry Lipman, Elderly's Suicide Rate Stirs Concern; Doctors Urged to Be
on Lookout, ATLANTA J., July 31, 1996, at A6.
13. In 1990, the suicide rate for the total population of the United States was
12.25 per 100,000. See Marquis, supra note 3.
14. See Jeff Kunerth, Suicide Rate Peaks Among the Elderly, and It's on the Rise,
HOUSTON CHRONlCLE, Sept. 15, 1996, at AI; Colburn, supra note 7, at 1.
15. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et aI., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide,
LANCET, June 29, 1996, at 1805, available in WESTLAW, P-ABS database; see also
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom Wash
ington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2
Cases Involving Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at A1. The fact that three
quarters of the population believe some patients should be permitted to seek assistance
in dying does not, of course, mean that three-quarters of the population would seek
such assistance if they were in such a situation.
16. See Emanuel, supra note 15.
17. See Jonathan S. Cohen et aI., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthana
sia Among PhYSicians in Washington State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 89 (1994). This study
showed that 54% of physician respondents indicated that euthanasia should be legal in
some situations, although only 33% were willing to participate in the act. Fifty-three
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show that the medical diagnosis of those requesting, and receiving
physician assistance in dying is primarily cancer, neurological disor
ders, or AIDS.ls However, patients' concerns in requesting assist
ance in dying encompass many factors that are not related to
physical pain, including loss of control, burdening others, being de
pendent upon others for intimate, personal care, and losing per
sonal dignity.19 In one study done in the Netherlands, pain was
cited as the sole reason behind a request for assistance in dying in
only 10% of all cases, and as a major factor in fewer than 50% of
the request for assistance cases.20
The majority of those requesting assistance in dying appear to
be women. Certainly that is true with those who have died with the
assistance of Dr. Kevorkian. To date, Dr. Kevorkian has assisted at
least forty-five individuals, thirty women and fifteen men. 21 Some
cast Dr. Kevorkian as a misogynist who aims most of his activity at
women and only works with men when people begin to wonder why
so many women die in his presence. Stephanie Gutmann, writing in
The New Republic, has noted that the men who sought Dr. Kevor
percent thought physician assisted suicide should be legal in some situations, but only
40% indicated a willingness to assist. Hematologists and oncologists were more likely
to oppose euthanasia and assisted suicide and psychiatrists were more likely to support
the practices. See id. at 89. See also Geriatricians' Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide;
Tips from Other Journals, 47 J. FAM. hAc. 949, 949 (1993) (stating that a majority of
physicians support a patient's right to die); Report ofthe Board of Trustees ofthe Ameri
can Medical Association; Transcript, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 81, 83 (1994) (indicating that
the Board of Thustees of the American Medical Association opposes euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide). In a study of Colorado physicians, 60% indicated they cared
for patients for whom they believed active euthanasia to be justifiable, and 59% indi
cated a willingness to supply lethal drugs in such cases were the act legal. In a study of
San Francisco physicians, 70% stated that patients with incurable terminal illnesses
should have an active euthanasia option, but only 45% expressed a willingness to assist
with such a request were it legal. See id.
18. See Anthony L. Back et aI., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919 (1996). In
San Francisco, there is an active "underground," consisting of AIDS patients, doctors,
lovers, and friends assisting people with AIDS in dying. See Sheryl StOlberg, Ending
Life on Their Own Terms; An Underground Network Helps San Francisco AIDS Pa
tients Who Choose to Die with a Doctor's Help, Surrounded by Loved Ones, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at At. A survey of 118 San Francisco physicians specializing in the
treatment of AIDS found that 53% admitted to having helped patients commit suicide
by writing prescriptions for narcotics. The suicide rate in such cases is artificially sup
pressed because of the tendency to ascribe a death by overdose to "natural causes." Id.
19. See Back et aI., supra note 18, at 921 (describing a study which reflects patient
concerns as perceived by physicians).
20. See Emanuel, supra note 15, at 1809.
2t. See Todd Nissen, Kevorkian May Face More Criminal Charges, REUTERS
NORlH AMERICAN WIRE, Nov. 4, 1996; Kevorkian Suicide List Stands at 44, BOSTON
HERALD, Oct. 25, 1996, at 6.
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kian's assistance had been diagnosed as terminally ill by their own
physicians, were in constant and severe pain from their medical di
agnoses, and often were physically incapacitated.22 The women,
Gutmann stated, had symptoms that were much more ambiguous,
had not been diagnosed as terminally ill, and had not been com
plaining of severe and constant pain.23 She suggested that women,
who seemingly worry more about their illness' impact on others, are
more vulnerable to those like Dr. Kevorkian. 24 She also noted that
Dr. Kevorkian took so long in deciding to assist individual men that
a number of his prospective male clients killed themselves before
he set a date for assisting them.25
I am not an apologist for Dr. Kevorkian and, in fact, he may be
a misogynist. Misogyny, however, is not why women seek him out.
They may, however, seek him out because they need assistance in
ending their lives and the regular medical establishment will not
generally provide it, nor will state legislatures make such assistance
legal.
When we talk of the so-called right to die-for the last two
decades, withholding or withdrawing medical care and more re
cently providing prescription drugs or even a lethal injection-the
discussion is based in a framework which is culturally very western,
white, heterosexual, and male focused. While the views of western,
white, heterosexual men need to be considered, there is something
wrong with reaching a conclusion that applies to all by using that
framework exclusively.
Miles and August studied final state appellate court rulings in
cases of twenty-two patients once competent but later incompetent
and existing on various forms of life support that their families or
guardians sought to terminate.26 None of the individuals had exe
cuted advanced directives addressing end-of-life decisions. Four
teen of those cases involved women and eight involved men. In six
out of the eight cases involving men (75%), the court determined
what the patient's decision concerning life-sustaining treatment
would have been, and permitted that decision to be effectuated.27
In all six, the court determined that the patient's decision would
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Die," 18
27.

See Gutmann, supra note 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
See id. at 85.
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have been to have treatment withdrawn.28 In one of the two re
maining cases involving 'men, the court delegated decision making
power to a family member and in the other to a physician.29 Of the
fourteen cases involving women, in only two (14%) was the court
able to discern the patient's preference. 3o In another six (43%), the
court delegated decision making power to a family member,31 in
three (21 %) to a physician,32 and in three (21 %) to an institution,
such as the court itself, or a hospital ethics committee. 33 Miles and
August found that the courts' reasoning in the cases brought on be
half of male patients accepted evidence of the men's treatment
preferences, and found their right to have those preferences exer
cised a matter of autonomy.34 The courts' reasoning in the cases
involving women found the women's expressions of preferences to
be unreflective, emotional, or immature. Women, but not men,
were described in childlike terms-fetal position, infantile state.
The parens patriae doctrine was asserted only in relation to women,
not men. The male patients were regarded by the courts as victims
of medical assault and therefore entitled to assert their autonomy
against that assault. Women, however, were perceived as being vul
nerable to medical neglect. In fact, in 86% of the cases someone
else was empowered not only to speak for them but also to decide
what they would say.35
So, women have been treated differently by the courts when
compared to similarly situated men in withdrawal of treatment
cases. Women tend to use less violent means when they attempt to
take their own lives. They are traditional caretakers, so they do not
want to burden others 'either with their care or with a long, slow
death watch. Is it so hard to imagine, then, that women would seek
the assistance of Dr. Kevorkian? Is it not understandable that if
assisted dying is prohibited, the primary effect of that prohibition
will fall on women because they are more reluctant or unable to
take their own lives, and because they are not provided with legally
sanctioned assistance?
Some might argue that women are lucky to be so "protected,"
28. See
29. See
30. See
31. See
32. See
33. See
34. See
35. See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 86.
at frl.
at 89.

at 90.
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and that in fact society should find a better way to protect men.
That, of course, raises the question of whether women need to be,
or want to be, protected. It is reminiscent of the issues surrounding
surrogate motherhood's debate in which even the feminist commu
nity is split over whether surrogacy should be prohibited in order to
protect the vulnerable from exploitation, or whether all women, in
cluding the poor and minority, should be accorded full decision
making power as competent adults.
Just as women may have concerns different from men in end
of-life decision making, those of different races or ethnicities, those
who are not heterosexual, those who are elderly, those who are not
able bodied, may have concerns different from able-bodied, hetero
sexual, white men. Those concerns must be taken into account in
formulating any rules concerning assisted dying.
One of the major arguments offered in opposition to assisted
dying is that the economically disadvantaged or racial and ethnic
minorities might become vulnerable to the assisted dying process.
Such a scenario is unlikely. First, white men are much more likely
to die of self-inflicted death than any other group in this country.36
Second, non-Hispanic whites are much more likely to execute ad
vanced directives-making formal plans for end-of-life decision
making-than are members of minority groupS.37 In fact, only 2%
of Asian Americans have formalized their end-of-life plans,
although they frequently tell their physicians their wishes, trusting
the spoken word over a writing.38 Some Asian American elders do
name surrogate decision makers, generally a son, for end-of-life de
cision making,39 reflecting the position of sons in Asian society. Af
rican Americans and Hispanics are also less likely than non
Hispanic whites to designate a surrogate, but if they do, the surro
gate is likely to be a daughter, reflecting the importance that wo
men play in African American and Hispanic families and social
structures.40 African Americans and Hispanics are also much more
likely to favor aggressive treatment at the end of life,41 possibly
based on distrust resulting from lifetimes of discrimination and less
than optimum medical care.
36. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
37. See Culture Explains People's Attitudes Toward Living Wills (National Public
Radio, Morning Edition, Aug. 28, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Scripts File.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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People from differ~nt cultures may also disagree over the no
tion of a "good death." Hospice care for the dying emphasizes a
peaceful, accepted death, at home with family present: in essence, a
white, middle class death. African Americans, however, are not as
favorably disposed to hospice care.42 After all, admission to the
hospice program requires accepting the inevitability of death within
months and agreeing to forego aggressive end-of-life treatment,
which, to some, is tantamount to giving up or surrendering.43 Those
of Chinese descent may not want to die at home because of cultural
beliefs that their ghost will haunt the place where they died, and
they do not want to impose that on their family.44
Of course, there is also the obvious danger when we begin to
consider the beliefs and traditions of those from different cultures,
that we will make assumptions based on stereotype. That is, we
might now assume that an African American patient wants aggres
sive care and that an Asian American prefers death in an institution
rather than at home. And, those assumptions might be wrong. 45
The message is that we must not operate on, or construct our rules
and our procedures based on, assumption, but rather on what we
know and learn from those at the center of our discussion.
Again at the risk of falling into opposite stereotypes, serious
scholars have shown us that not all people think alike, not all peo
ple make decisions in the same way.46 When those courts deciding
withdrawal of treatment cases involving women patients referred to
the expressions of preference by women as unreflective, emotional,
or immature, and when the women assisted by Dr. Kevorkian were
described as having more ambiguous symptoms than the men
whom he assisted, what the courts and the author may well have
been describing was not the indecisiveness of which we traditionally
accuse women, but rather a reflection of women's means of making
decisions. 47 Women and perhaps members of many ethnic and cul
tural groups are much less individually oriented and much more
communally oriented than non-Hispanic white men. That sense of
42. See Barbara A. Koenig & Jan Gates-Williams, Understanding Cultural Differ
ence in Caring for Dying Patients: Caring for Patients at the End of Life, 163 W.J. MED.
244 (1995).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (examining the different modes of thinking be
tween men and women).
47. See id. at 71-74.
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relationship is reflected in their conversations, in their decision
making patterns, and in the effectuation of their decisions. 48
Rather than attempting to force women and minorities into the
mold we have developed for end-of-life decision making, including
how we deal with assisted death, we need to consider how our prac
tices should reflect differences among all members of our society.
The simplest solution would be to say that assisted death will
be prohibited. That way there will be no negative repercussions
from incorrect diagnoses, no coercion of the vulnerable, and no sug
gestion that physicians violate their ethical codes. Sometimes, I
find that argument appealing and one I can defend, because I too
fear that mistakes sometimes will be made, that the diagnosis may
not be correct, that the patient may be suffering from a treatable
mental illness from which she may recover and live a long, satisfy
ing life.
On the other hand, I find myself tom both professionally and
personally. There are persons in pain so severe it cannot be allevi
ated, there are persons so overcome by life's circumstances that
their non-physical pain also cannot be soothed, there are those
whose personal dignity is so invaded that I have serious doubts
about a blanket prohibition on assisted death. Many know the
story of Dax Cowart, a man severely burned in a gas line explosion
who begged to have treatment withdrawn so he could die and es
cape the pain.49 His treatment was not withdrawn and he survived.
His life subsequent to his recovery has seen a marriage that did not
work, but a second one that did; a law degree; attempts at suicide;
severe vision and hearing impairments.50 Today Mr. Cowart says
his life is worth living, but he also says that despite that, he thinks
his wishes regarding withdrawal of treatment should have been
honored, and he should have been allowed to die. 51 I would not
presume to second guess Dax Cowart, and I do not think the law
should do so either.
My own personal concern goes even further than the compe
tent patient in intractable pain or near death from cancer or AIDS.
My personal concern would take us down that slippery slope to the
48. See id. at 8-9, 16-17, 169-74.
49. See Leslie Sowers, Bum Victim is Working to Ensure Patients' Rights, TIMES
PICAYUNE, Sept. 21, 1996, at A15; Christine Wicker, 'Can't You See I'm a Dead Man?'
Miracle Workers Made Dax Cowart Survive; He Still Wishes They Hadn't, CHI. TRIB.,
May 18, 1989, at Cl.
50. See Sowers, supra note 49; Wicker, supra note 49.
51. See Sowers, supra note 49; Wicker, supra note 49.
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incompetent patient who made end-of-life decisions concerning as
sisted dying when she was competent. I have watched Alzheimer's
Disease destroy people of three generations in my family-my
great-grandfather, his daughter (who was my grandmother), and
her daughter (who was my mother). I did not know Grandpa
Moore very well, but I have heard a lot about him. I knew my
grandmother and my mother very well. They were proud, bright,
capable, fiercely independent women. They rarely asked anyone
for anything, and my mother was the classic caretaker. They valued
their dignity above all other personal characteristics, and they never
wanted anyone to take care of them. When my grandmother be
came ill and deteriorated through confusion to the point where she
was a danger to herself, to the stage where she could no longer live
alone, to the days in which she was in a nursing home, finally bed
ridden, and unable to speak during the last several years of her life,
I heard my mother wish for her mother's death on many occasions,
and wish for her own if she ever seemed headed for the same end.
Eventually, she did head to that end. She was somewhat luckier
than Grandma; her disease progressed faster, an eight to ten year
duration. Unlike Grandma, who was over ninety years old when
she died, my mother died at the age of seventy-six. Furthermore,
unlike Grandma, my mother never went to a nursing home because
my sister sacrificed two years of her own life to care for her. How
ever, despite the fact that she was: cared for by a loving daughter,
she had lost that quick, bright mind that she valued so, and she
suffered personal indignities that most of us care not to think about.
Naturally, I wonder if I am next in line.
When Janet Adkins sought and received Dr. Kevorkian's
assistance in dying, many people were appalled not only at him, but
at her. She was in her fifties and had recently been diagnosed with
Alzheimer's.52 The week before her death, she was able to play
tennis with her son and even to win the match, but she could not
remember the score. 53 Janet Adkins feared what her life would be
like over the course of her disease. I assume she knew that should
she become incompetent she could no longer seek assistance in dy
ing, so she acted while she was competent and still had time. Had
Janet Adkins known that when her disease reached a certain point
she would in fact be assisted in dying, she might not have sought
52.

See Bonnie Johnson et aI., A Vital Woman Chooses Death,

1990, at 40.

53. See id.

PEOPLE,

June 25,
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Dr. Kevorkian's assistance when she did. I~ fact, many people who
die from intentional self-inflicted injuries might choose to live
longer if they could be assured that someone would help them to
end their lives at a future time.
I think we talk much too theoretically and perhaps disingenu
ously about end-of-life decision making. Admittedly, I worry that
when we move away from abstractions the debate focuses on
"worst case" scenarios. The opponents raise the specter of the pov
erty stricken, eighty-five year old woman, alone, in the nursing
home with no one to care for her and protect her, and the propo
nents compare the inhumane treatment of patients in intractable
pain with the humane euthanasia of dying pets. I agree with those
who equate withdrawal of treatment with assisted death. The per
son from whom the ventilator or feeding tubes are withdrawn dies
because she can no longer breathe or because she no longer draws
sustenance. The physician or some other person acted to create
that end. It is disingenuous to pretend that assisted dying is not
going on every day, not only through withdrawal of treatment but
through injections of lethal doses of pain killers, and through the
writing of prescriptions. Compassion in Dying v. Washington 54 and
Quill v. Vacco 55 did not come from suddenly discovered scenarios.
Those cases just happen to be the first legal challenges to statutes
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, brought by, and because of,
physicians who fear legal liability for assisting others in dying just as
they earlier feared legal liability if they were to withdraw life-sus
taining treatment from patients. 56
It is naive or hypocritical to pretend that, whatever the Court's
decision, assisted dying will not continue. Rules relating to end-of
life decision making are made by the living and may well be based
on what we hope, or fear, will happen to us when the rules are
applied. While those opposed to assisted dying may caution those
in favor "to be careful what they wish for because they might get
it," the proponents of assisted dying might urge the same caution
against the opponents. Furthermore, since assisted dying occurs on
a regular basis, with the agreement and participation of health care
providers, some of those who publicly oppose assisted death may
well believe that if their pain-however it is defined-is ever so
54. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
55. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997).
56. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666-67 (N.J. 1976).
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great they cannot continue living, they will have access to assistance
in dying, even if such assistance is prohibited.57
Perhaps I believe as I do, or at least think the discussion to be
both too theoretical and disingenuous because I am a woman. I
may think and communicate differently than others engaging in this
debate. I am much more persuaded by individual scenarios than I
am by theory. I believe that not only is it permissible for the debate
to be emotional, but also that we will lose important perspectives if
we do not allow it to be emotional. I do not claim to be objective in
the assisted dying debate. Nor do I claim that my views are neces
sarily correct or that my way of thinking is the only appropriate
approach to the topic. I claim only that to define the terms of the
debate in the traditional western, white, heterosexual male analyti
cal method will lead to the wrong conclusion for many.58 I have
long told my students that the times I worry most about my ideas,
and the times I most need to continue to think about them, is when
I truly believe I am right. I think that is a fitting caution for all who
engage in the assisted dying discussion.
There is no objection that has been raised to assisted dying that
was not also raised to withholding or withdrawing treatment, yet,
the fears that were forecast when the withdrawal of treatment cases
were being decided have not materialized. The elderly, the dis
abled, the poor, and members of minority groups have not been
coerced into having treatment withheld. We have not seen any
57. Such a scenario would not be unlike that which existed before abortion be
came a legally protected procedure. Despite prohibitions on abortion, many women
from educated, financially secure situations were able to procure abortions, frequently
under the guise of therapeutic gynecologic treatment. There is no reason to believe that
those who oppose assistance in dying for the general population would not avail them
selves of access to assisted dying for themselves or their loved ones, further illustrating
the disingenuousness of the opponents' arguments. Some readers may accuse me of
raising unsubstantiated fears about those who oppose assisted dying. However, one of
the participants in this symposium, an articulate critic of assisted dying, made exactly
this suggestion to me, indicating that I need not fear an outcome like my ancestors',
even if assisted dying is banned, because I will be educated enough and savvy enough to
find someone to help me die even if the practice is prohibited.
Of course the reverse analogy is even worse. That is, like women who sought ille
gal, "back alley" abortions before the procedure became legal (and still do in those
instances where abortion is geographically or financially beyond their means), some of
those who want assistance in dying will tum to "back alley" specialists. Indeed, at least
forty-five individuals have already sought the assistance of Dr. Kevorkian. The result of
those decisions-if the procedure is "botched"-may be continued life in an even worse
.
physical, mental, or emotional condition.
58. In fact, one of the mistakes we make in this debate is to assume that there is
one conclusion to be reached. There may well be many appropriate conclusions based
upon many factors relevant to different people.
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greater diminishing respect for the value of life. We have, some
would say, started down the slope, not in the direction of withdraw
ing care from the vulnerable, but in the direction of hastening death
in a different manner.59 Part of that hastening, however, is more
apparent than real given the fact that assisted dying has been occur
ring and will continue to occur. Perhaps the vulnerable would be
much better protected were the practice performed openly rather
than in secret.
Will there be mistakes made if we make assisted dying legal?
It is hard to imagine that there will not be, just as it is hard to imag
ine that there have not been mistakes concerning withdrawal of
treatment. But why do we assume bad faith, rather than good faith,
on the part of physicians, families, and society?60 And, why do we
focus on worst case scenarios rather than engaging in the discussion
in which we need to participate, both to determine how to set our
standards and how to effectuate individuals' wishes?
In his superb essay, Dying as Failure,61 Dr. Lewis Thomas
wrote,
It is true, as everyone says these days, that doctors do not
know what to do about death. Patients who are known to be
dying are segregated as much as possible from all the others, and
as the clinically unmistakable process of dying gets under way the
doctors spend as little time in attendance as they can manage.
What is not so generally recognized is that doctors, espe
cially young doctors, are as frightened and bewildered by the act
of death as everyone else. . .. Death is shocking, dismaying, even
terrifying.
A dying patient is a kind of freak. It is the most unaccept
able of all abnormalities, an offense against nature itself.

The difference [between a hospital in the 1930s and] a mod
em hospital, apart from the change from open wards to mostly
59. Some of the current opponents to assisted dying were instrumental in pursu
ing the rights of individuals to have life sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn.
They were then opposed by others who warned that one of the next steps would be calls
for assisted suicide or active euthanasia. Perhaps some of those who now oppose as
sisted dying do so as a defensive reaction to those who earlier warned against the slip
pery slope leading from withdrawal of treatment. That is, as the withdrawal of
treatment opponents are saying "I told you so," the withdrawal of treatment propo
nents/assisted dying opponents respond, "this far, but no further."
60. See Bender, supra note to, at 533.
61. Lewis Thomas, Dying as Failure, 447 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 1

(1980).
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private rooms, was in the age of the patients who died. Dying
could occur, and did, at any. age. It was not an event reserved for
the very old, or for the middle-aged patients who had reached the
end of their long battles with cancer or heart disease or strokes.
Many of the patients who died on the open wards of the City
Hospital were young people, overwhelmed by an infectious dis
ease-lobar pneumonia, meningitis, septicemia, tuberculosis
for which there was no effective treatment of any kind.
The inevitability of death was plainer to see in those days.
For a great many of the ordinary illnesses that brought patients
into the hospital, dying was the expected outcome, beyond the
control of any doctor. Death was more normal.
. . . Everyone knew about death at first hand; there was
nothing unfamiliar or even queer about the phenomenon. Peo
ple seem to have known a lot more about the process itself than
is the case today. The "deathbed" was a real place, and the dying
person usually knew where he was and when it was time to as
semble the family and call for the priest.
Today, the average span of human life in our society stands
at around 73 years, the longest run at living yet achieved. Obvi
ously, most of the dying is done by old people. It makes a differ
ent sort of problem for the human mind. Dying is not so often
the tragic striking-down that it was; it is more like the end of a
slow process of running-down, more like a slow collapse. We
know about its inevitability, but we do not have the same appre
hension that it is there, waiting just around the comer, ready to
leap.
And so we have come, just in the past 40 years, to view
death as a sort of failure, just as we now look at the process of
aging itself as failure. We have lost, in this changed view, the old
feeling of respect for dying, and all the awe.
I do not know what we are doing to the first-hand experi
ence of dying itself with our techilology, but I suspect we may
often be interfering with an important process.
Dying is a process, I believe. I'm not sure of it, but I think
so. The organism seems to come apart in orderly stages.
Most of the time, it is not a bad feeling. Sir William Osler
wrote about it, pointing out that the popular notion of death ag
ony was a fiction; people died, at the moment of the dying, in
tranquility.
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The time may come when medicine will have found out
enough about disease mechanisms to think its way around all of
today's other lethal human diseases, as effectively as by the tech
niques for treating infection. We may be left then with no way of
dying except by wearing out in old age, barring trauma. It will be
the kind of event we now call natural death, ending the lives of
very old people in their sleep.
Meanwhile, we are part way along. We have not lost our
fear of dying, nor our sense of its ultimate inevitability. But I am
afraid that we have lost something else-our respect for it. In a
sense quite new to our culture we have become ashamed of
death, and we try to hide it, or hide ourselves away from it. It is,
to our way of thinking, failure.62
As we continue the debate on assisted dying, perhaps we need
to remember that dying is not an event, but the end of the process
of living. And in providing individuals with options in the dying
process we need to consider whether, rather than decreasing our
respect for life, we are in fact increasing that respect. Perhaps we
need to think of death not as failure, but as a successful, dignified,
humane end to a life well lived.
EPILOGUE

As this volume was going to press, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the decisions of the Circuit Courts in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco. 63 Those decisions will not
end assisted dying. Rather, the practice will continue as it has until
now-patients will die as their morphine is increased and their
breathing suppressed; some physicians will prescribe drugs that
they know will be lethal to their patients if the patients take an
excessive amount; in the worst case scenario, family members and
friends will kill, sometimes using violent means, their loved ones
who beg to die. Occasionally, mistakes will still be made-both in
those instances where patients are assisted in dying and in those
where they are not. Had the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco, states
would have begun to search for new ways to regulate assisted dying.
With the reversal, assisted dying proponents will search for new
ways to change the law and continue the practice. The effort of
62. Id. at 2-4.
63. See Vacco v. Quill, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 138
. L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
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both sides must recognize that the issues raised by assisted dying
have many appropriate responses and solutions. In crafting those
responses, both proponents and opponents of assisted dying must
take into account the life circumstances of all those affected by as
sisted dying. To paraphrase the eloquence of Dr. Thomas, to do
otherwise is failure.

